What determines optimal R&D investment in a market with indirect network effects? We analyze this question in a hardware-software framework, where software firms strategically invest in quality upgrades. We find that a firm's optimal investment depends predominantly on (1) the quality level of its software relative to its competitors on the same hardware and on (2) the quality levels of all software firms on the same platform relative to those on competing hardware platforms. Using a dynamic model we examine firms' investment responses to changes in their own quality levels as well as changes in competitors' quality levels. We show that intense competition across platforms stimulates investment across firms on the same platform, regardless of their current quality level. However, when competition across platforms is weak, firms may find it optimal to increase or reduce their investment in response to their own or their competitors' quality upgrades. This gives rise to a matrix of optimal investment strategies. Since these strategies depend on market structure, we can map each firm's optimal strategy into its position within the market.
1.

INTRODUCTION
It is well established that the value of a software innovation crucially depends on the market share of compatible hardware, commonly referred to as the installed base. This has been extensively discussed in the literature for the classic example of computer hardware and software (e.g., Church and Gandal, 1992) . 1 But how does the size of the installed hardware base influence optimal investment in software innovation? It turns out that the seemingly obvious answer -the larger the size of the installed base, the larger the optimal investment -is more often false than true.
Hardware-software markets typically exhibit indirect network effects-the more attractive the available software for a particular hardware, the more consumers want to buy this hardware. This, in turn, attracts more software developers to develop compatible software. 2 Indirect network effects are not unique to the computer industry. Other frequently cited examples include the markets for video-games, DVDs, the internet, and even electric cars, to name examples that recently made headline news. Video-games need game-consoles like Microsoft's X-Box or Sony's Playstation on which to run. The more consumers who own a specific gameconsole, the higher the incentives for game developers to offer high-quality games for this console. DVDs need DVD players to play on, and the more consumers who own high-definition DVD players capable of playing a particular format, the more film studios will upgrade their current DVD offerings to the new highdefinition DVD standard. For example, the market went largely in Blu-ray's favor after the largest movie studio supporting HD DVD, Warner Brothers, decided to abandon releasing films on HD-DVD. 3 The more consumers who have access to the internet, the more attractive it is to develop services that can be delivered through it. Finally, the lack of fuelling stations for H 2 or electric cars is frequently cited as a hindrance of producers to mass producing these cars. 1 In a recent weblog, commentators find it noteworthy to announce whenever a software developer switches from a larger platform to a smaller one, since this indicates trust in the future of the switched-to platform. See, for example, Michaels (2006) . 2 This is in contrast to direct network effects, where the size of the installed base directly influences consumers' choice.
For example, the larger the size of a cellular phone network, the more attractive it is for consumers to acquire access to it. 3 "Warner backs Sony Blu-ray format," BBC News, 7 January 2008.
Hardware-software markets typically feature the following characteristics: software requires compatible hardware to run on, and hardware generally lives longer than software. For example, game-consoles outlast more than one video-game generation, and it is usually the latest games that are in fashion and are most frequently played. The internet has outlasted the dot-com bust, which saw many internet applications come and go. The newest movies attract the highest attention, and while electric cars have been invented more than a century ago, only the most recent ones receive interest from the press. Indirect network effects can be driven either by variety or quality. For example, Nintendo's dominance in the video-game market during the late 80s was mainly driven by the quality of the video-games Nintendo and its licensees offered (see Sheff, 1994) . Learning from Atari's disaster, Nintendo closely monitored the quality of every available game, ensuring that all available games were of superior quality. In converse, during the early stages of the DVD technology, the DVD market was mainly driven by variety. During this period, demand for DVD-players largely depended on the number of movies available on DVD. Rarely, however, will one find cases where only one of the drivers -variety or quality -is exclusively present. Demand for Sony Playstations depends both on the quality and variety of compatible games. Unpopular movies don't sell DVD-players and hard-to-use internet applications do not easily find customers. Previous literature has mostly focused on models of variety and assumed a fixed investment to create a new variety. This paper, in contrast, analyzes the effect of market structure on firms' investment in quality upgrades in markets where indirect network effects are present.
When software firms upgrade the quality of their products, they may attract consumers from competitors producing for the same or for a different hardware. For example, Sony's Playstation is challenged by Microsoft's X-box and Nintendo's Wii. They may also attract consumers who so far did not purchase any hardware at all, but chose alternative consumption possibilities, for example PC games or even going to the movies. Consequently, the attractiveness of the entire video-game market is affected by innovation in PC games or other forms of home entertainment. 4 The combination of indirect network effects with competition from consumption alternatives creates complex dynamics in the software market, which require sophisticated investment decisions. It is these effects on investment decisions we study in this paper.
Software firms invest in R&D based on expected future profits, taking competitive responses from other firms into account. These responses may come from competitors offering software for the same or for a different hardware. Furthermore, firms' decisions are also affected by consumers' choices, which in turn are based on firms' investment strategies. It is virtually impossible to solve analytically for the equilibrium of a game with such complex interaction. Consequently, following Ericson and Pakes (1995) , we use numerical analysis to derive conditions for optimal investment behavior in our model.
In general, our results show that optimal investment depends strongly on how close the race is within as well as across platforms at any point in time. When a firm increases its quality, it strengthens its competitive position relative to its competitors on the same platform. It also increases the strength of its platform overall.
These changes influence the market structure and consequently feed back into the level of competition on and between platforms. Competitive advantage of software firms is therefore defined on two margins: relative to its competitor on the same hardware platform and relative to the industry overall. The first case is straightforward: a software firm's competitive advantage on its hardware platform is the additional willingness-to-pay consumers have for its software relative to the closest competitor on its own hardware platform. 5 The second case is more complicated: a firm with superior quality may unfortunately be tied to an overall weak platform, and thus lose market share whenever consumers are free to switch to another platform.
That is, achieving competitive advantage relative to the industry is inseparably tied to the performance of all other software firms on the same platform. Consequently, only a software firm on a leading platform can have competitive advantage in the industry.
Changes in market-structure can be induced by the firm itself or by a competitor. Whether a firm responds aggressively and increases its investment or instead becomes complacent depends on whether An analysis of the gaming market more generally may include PCs and even the internet as competing platforms. In this case, movies may be thought of as an outside good. 5 This conceptual link between competitive advantage and willingness to pay follows Adner and Zemsky (2006) . competitive forces within and across platforms increase or decrease as a consequence of the change in market structure. For example, a firm may invest aggressively because its own quality upgrade moved it closer to its competitors on the same platform or because it moved its platform's quality closer to that of competing platforms. A firm may also invest more aggressively because a direct competitor on the same platform upgraded its quality and therefore moved the platform that hosts both firms closer to the quality level of competing platforms.
This analysis suggests the following categorization of firms' investment behavior: for any given market structure, a firm can respond either aggressively or complacently to an increase in its own quality. Moreover, an increase in its competitor's quality can also induce a firm to respond either aggressively or complacently.
Therefore, we sort firms' investment behavior into four categories, which are a combination of their type of behavior -aggressive or complacent, and its causes -an own or a competitor's increase in quality. Each market structure can then be mapped into one of these four categories under which optimal investment behavior is either aggressive or complacent, and investment strategies are either strategic complements or strategic substitutes.
In industries with network effects, installed base, market structure and competition are of paramount importance. This therefore puts our analysis in the midst of the competitive strategy literature (Porter, 1980) . Additionally, we contribute to two lines of literature. First, we extend the literature on markets with network effects (e.g., Saloner, 1985 and Shapiro, 1985 and Church and Gandal, 1992; Gandal et al., 2000; and Gandal and Dranove, 2003, among many others) . While the empirical studies document the importance of network effects, the theoretical ones concentrate mainly on the long-run structure of the industry (i.e., standardization vs. variety). This paper takes a different approach and focuses on the optimal investment strategies of software firms in those markets. Within the literature on network effects, we add, in particular, to the literature on dynamic platform competition. For the computer industry, Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) provide an excellent description of firms' behavior in the presence of platforms. We add to their insights by analyzing the underlying drivers of investment in R&D. In addition, we use their examples to provide evidence consistent with the predictions of our model. Second, we show how the existence of platforms influences investment in R&D. 6 Our within-platform results generally resemble those of Grossman and Shapiro (1987) , who find that the leading firm always invests more than the follower (i.e., investment strategies are strategic substitutes). However, as in Doraszelski (2003), we find that investment strategies of firms on the same platform can be either strategic complements or strategic substitutes, depending on how strong competitive forces are from the competing platform.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we describe and formally present the model. We then present the results, where we demonstrate how the existence of platforms influences the incentives of software firms to invest in quality upgrades. The results from this analysis allow us to develop a taxonomy of investment strategies. We then compare the results from our model to examples in the literature as well as to recent developments in the computer industry. The fifth section concludes.
THE MODEL
We present our model in two steps. First we state the ideas that motivated the model specification and the assumptions that attempt to reflect them. Then, we present a formal version of the model, which can be skipped without loss of comprehension for readers not interested in the technical details.
Model Assumptions
Consumers in hardware-software industries, typically, keep their hardware for longer than just one software cycle. Therefore, when making hardware decisions they form expectations regarding future quality levels of all software on all platforms. At the same time, software firms have higher incentives to upgrade if the market they can potentially address is large. Consequently, firms' incentives to invest in quality upgrades depend on the current as well as future number of consumers who own the compatible hardware. To reflect dependence on future opportunities, we assume an infinite horizon discrete choice model where consumers live forever and derive utility from the consumption of software. Consumers' willingness-to-pay increases in the quality of software, and decreases in its price. We assume that software needs compatible hardware to operate on, but that hardware provides no stand-alone benefits. Consumers choose the hardware for which software promises the best expected quality-price relationship. To keep the setup simple, we assume that consumers can only choose from two incompatible hardware platforms, and that there are no more than two software firms producing for each platform. Every period, all consumers need to renew or replace their software licenses. Hardware has to be replaced, on average, every two periods. That is, every period one-half of the consumers on each platform can choose to change their hardware. In other words, in each period, all consumers buy software, while half of them are also free to replace their hardware -assuming it offers them higher net benefits. 7
The investment process is assumed to be stochastic were the probability of successful innovation increases with the firm's level of investment. A successful investment increases the firm's quality by one unit, while an unsuccessful investment becomes obsolete. Firms base their investment strategies on their relative position in the market, as well as on their platform's relative position. Since consumers own the hardware for two periods, when deciding on hardware, consumers must form expectations about future software qualities.
The industry as a whole will be larger if it offers higher value to consumers than substitute markets do.
For example, TV broadcasts, DVDs and Videos may lose attractiveness for certain age groups if new developments in the gaming industry progress further. Consumers will then be less likely to pursue next best alternatives to video games and the video game industry will consequently be larger. We therefore measure software quality relative to the quality of the next best alternatives. In order to capture advances in the quality of those next best alternatives, we assume that if the quality level of them increases by one unit, the quality level of all available software (on both platforms) decreases by one unit. Finally, in order to innovate effectively, software firms frequently possess platform-specific knowledge: developing software for more than one platform can be prohibitively costly. We therefore restrict firms to only one platform, and, for simplicity, to only one software product.
The timing of the game is as follows: in the first stage, consumers and firms observe current qualities of available software on both platforms as well as platforms' market shares. Consumers choose which hardware to buy and software firms simultaneously choose how much to invest in quality. In the second stage, firms compete in prices, and consumers buy one unit of software or their next best alternative. In the third stage, nature determines which firms' investments were successful, and whether there was an increase in the quality of the next best alternative. Note that investment realization affects qualities only in the following period.
Formal Analysis
We employ the same basic set-up as in Markovich (2008) and adapt Pakes and McGuire (1994) to incorporate dynamics in consumers' decisions. For simplicity, we assume that all firms develop the same type of software (e.g., spreadsheets, word-processors, or office suites) and allow for no more than two platforms, A and B, as well as no more than two software firms on each platform. Since the analysis for platform B mirrors that of A, we present here the analysis for only platform A.
Let W={0,1,2,…,K} be a finite set of possible quality levels of software, and let represent the quality of software firm j producing for platform A.
is the vector of quality levels of both firms producing for hardware A, and σ is the market share of platform A. 8 
Willingness to Pay
Consumers derive benefits solely from software, which needs compatible hardware to operate. We assume that hardware itself does not provide any benefit on its own. In each period, half of the consumers who own a particular hardware are randomly selected to replace their units. These consumers can elect to 8 σ is the formal equivalent of the "installed base," as defined in the introduction (see Farrell and Saloner, 1986) .
either stay with the type of hardware they already have or switch to the alternative. Firms license software to consumers for one period. After that, consumers can either renew the license at the then-available quality level and price, or they can elect to switch to another software firm. Consumers who are not randomly selected for hardware choice have to select software for the hardware they already possess. For any given period, the willingness-to-pay of consumer l who owns hardware A and holds a license from firm 1 for software with quality level is , where ε 1l denotes differences in taste among consumers (e.g., within the spreadsheet market, some consumers like Lotus while others prefer Excel).
Software Choice. Consumers select software from the set of qualities and prices available to them. They acquire a license for one unit of software, unless the best consumption alternative provides them with higher benefits, denoted by ε 0 . We assume that consumers' preferences, ε, are independently and identically distributed according to a standard double exponential distribution. As McFadden (1973) shows, denoting the price of software k by p k , consumer l acquires a license from firm 1 with probability:
Hardware Choice. Consumers who can choose hardware in a given period do so by evaluating current and future software qualities for each hardware platform. If consumers purchase hardware A, their expected benefit is the sum of the benefits from software they purchase during the two periods they own the hardware. 9 Consumer l's expected net benefit from purchasing hardware A is then:
and are the consumer's expected willingness to pay for licensing software j in the current period and software k in the next period, respectively.
A represents consumer l's preferences over 9 As noted before, consumers replace hardware on average every two periods. Consequently, while some of the consumers replace hardware after one period, some hold their hardware for many periods. For simplicity, we assume that consumers expect to hold the hardware for two periods, and make decisions based on these expectations. 
k , are distributed independently and identically and follow a standard double exponential distribution. Then, again employing McFadden (1973) , consumer l purchases platform A with probability:
Given our assumptions and eq. (3), platform A's market share in the next period is given by
The Market for Software
We now turn to the dynamics in the software market. 10 Each software firm only develops one type of software, which is compatible with only one of the platforms. Software firms compete oligopolistically on quality and prices. If software firms want to improve the quality of their product, they need to invest. We assume that the outcome of this investment is stochastic and depends on the level of each firm's investment.
Whether the investment is successful is revealed in the following period. Each firm's quality level in the next period is determined by three factors: its current quality level, its level of investment, and whether the substitute industry that produces the best alternative consumption possibility improve the quality of their products. We assume that quality levels for each firm follow a Markov process where future qualities depend only on current qualities, regardless of how the firm reached this level.
As noted before, advances in the PC games market negatively affect the video game market. That is, advances in substitute industries erode quality advantages of software in our market. We therefore measure software qualities relative to the quality of those substitute industries. Any innovation in substitute industries reduces the quality advantage of all software on both platforms by one unit. Consequently, if is firm j's current quality level,
is the realization of firm j's investment, and v∈{0,1} represents the success of substitute industries in upgrading their quality, then next period's quality level, , is described by the following Markov process:
We let δ denote the probability of an improvement in the quality of the outside good in each period:
We assume that there are no research spillovers: each firm's probability of a successful investment depends only on its own investment. In particular, if firm j's investment level is x j , then its transition probability is:
Firms' Profits. While investment decisions are dynamic, we assume that the pricing game is a static game with no future effects or dynamics. 11 Firms choose prices to maximize profits in the current period and cannot strategically discount their software in order to attract more consumers in the future. All software firms on both platforms take software demand as given from equation (1) and set prices such as to maximize perperiod profits. Per-period profits for firm 1 on platform A are given by:
11 Despite the static nature of the pricing game and the fact that prices are independent of quality levels on the other platform, profits do depend on the market share of the hardware a firm produces for. However, this market share is influenced by the quality levels of firms producing for the competing hardware.
where M>0 is the total size of the market and, in the interest of parsimony, we abstract from marginal and fixed costs of production. σ is the percentage of consumers who own platform A. The first-order condition (FOC), the derivative of (6) with respect to p 1 , is
It can be shown that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the pricing game (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991) . This Nash equilibrium can be computed by numerically solving the system of FOCs. The per-period profit of firm 1 in the Nash equilibrium of the pricing game is then given by σMπ 1 (a 1 ,a 2 ), where 
where is firm 1's investment on platform A. , and are defined similarly. P( . ) is given by equation (5), and E(σ'|S) is given by equation (4). The right-hand side of equation (8) 
Such that:
The strategies are optimal given the value functions .
(ii) For every state S= (σ,a,b) , the value functions describe the present value of profits realized when both firms play the equilibrium strategies .
A full formal equilibrium definition and the computational algorithm can be found in Markovich (2008) .
2.2.3
Parameterization.
We chose the following set of parameter values for the equilibrium computation. There is a total of ten consumers in the market, i.e., M=10. Since our focus is on software, we normalize hardware prices P A = P B to be equal to zero. Market shares of platforms run from 0% to 100%, and are calculated in increments of 5%.
We think of each period as one year and set the discount factor β = 0.92. Given these parameter values, software firms find it unprofitable to invest in quality upgrades, regardless of market structure, if they reach a quality level of K=6. Once a software firm has reached this quality level, it chooses not to invest at all. We therefore fix K at 6.
We will present all of the results with graphs. Since it is impossible to display our results for all possible value combinations of the model, we select intermediate starting values for the graphs: each platform starts with a market share of 50%, and the level of outside competition, δ, is also set to 0.5. Departing from these values only changes the relative magnitude of the effects, while the principle mechanisms stay the same. 12
NETWORK EFFECTS AND THE INCENTIVES TO INVEST
Profits of firms in markets with network effects 13 depend not only on the firm's competitive position within its platform, but also on the position of the platform relative to competing platforms. The same is true for optimal investment strategies, since they are derived from profit maximizing behavior in our model. investment responses to an upgrade in the quality of the firm's own product (own effect) and in the quality level of a competing product (cross effect). Finally, when we interact the own and cross effects we are able to categorize the outcome in an investment response matrix.
The Effect of Quality Differences on Firms' Investments Strategies
To see the effect of quality differences within and across platforms, we present three examples. Figure   3 .1 exhibits the investment strategy of firm 1, holding the quality levels of both firms on the competing platform fixed at low (1,1), medium (3,3) and high (6,6). Firm 1's investment behavior is presented as a function of its own quality level and the quality level of its competitor on the same platform. Although it is tempting to describe all features of these graphs, we will highlight only few major features. Optimal 12 Figures with other parameter values are available upon request from the authors. 13 We formally define the network effect as the increase in a platform's market share due to an increase in the quality level of one of its firms while holding the quality level of firms on competing platforms fixed.
investment strongly varies with the firm's position relative to its competitor on the same platform, as well as relative to the quality level of the competitors on the competing platform. 14 In general, a firm on a leading platform invests more than a firm on a lagging platform. This can be seen by comparing investment levels in state (3,3) in the left panel with investment levels in state (1,1) in the middle panel in figure 3 .1. The first shows firms' investments on the leading platform, while the second pictures firms' investment on the lagging platform for the same case. Second, as long as the lead is small, leaders invest more than followers. If the lead is large, this may be reversed-and the follower may invest more than the leader. This is true both within and across platforms. To see this, one can compare the column where the competition across platforms is the strongest (e.g., state (3, 3) in the middle panel or (1, 1) in the left panel) with the surrounding columns, e.g. moving right in the same row implies the depicted platform takes the lead, while moving left implies it falls behind. 
Investment Responses
In order to better understand investment behavior, we study firms' responses-in terms of investmentto an own quality upgrade, as well as a competitor's quality upgrade. We define a firm's own investment elasticity (hereafter "own elasticity") to be the percentage change in the firm's investment level given a one percent change in its own quality level. 15 A firm's cross investment elasticity (hereafter "cross elasticity") is the percentage change in a firm's investment level given a one percent change in its competitor's quality level.
Figure 3.2 shows firm 1's own-and cross-elasticities, denoted and respectively, as a function of within and across platforms quality differences. In figure 3.2 and 3.4 below, we set the quality level of both firms on platform B to 3. In those graphs, Δ-inter is the difference between the sum of qualities on platform A and the sum of qualities on platform B, which is equal to 6. If the firms on platform A, for example, assume quality levels 5 and 3, the sum of their qualities is 8, which leads platform B by two quality units and Δ-inter = 2. If both firms on platform A assume a quality level of 1, platform A is behind and Δ-inter = -4. Δ-intra is the difference between the quality levels of firm 1 and firm 2 on platform A. Using the same examples from above, Δ-intra = 2 in the first example and Δ-intra = 0 in the second. A complete list of quality combinations for all Δ-intra and Δ-inter used in the graphs is provided in the appendix A. Figure 3 .2. Own-and cross-investment elasticities with respect to quality upgrades.
We start with own-investment elasticities. As the left panel shows, the more firm 1 lags behind firm 2 (∆-intra < 0), the stronger is its investment response to its own quality upgrade. Once firm 1 leads, the opposite effect can be observed. The intuition behind this result is as follows: if a firm lags behind, a successful upgrade increases the probability of catching up and thus increases the firm's incentives to invest in quality upgrades. The increase in incentives is the largest when quality differences between firms are still large.
However, once a firm has become a far leader, it cannot win additional market share on its own platformonly from the other platform -decreasing the leading firm's incentives to invest. Therefore, a far leader decreases its investment in response to its own quality increase.
Inter-platform differences affect investment as follows. In general, when quality differences across platforms are small, firms' responses to their own increases in quality are the strongest. This is a consequence of the network effect -As Markovich and Moenius (2008) show, when platforms are close, the market is very competitive and small changes in quality levels have relatively large effects on platforms' market shares.
Firms, therefore, increase investment to enhance the attractiveness of their platform. Once their platform is ahead or behind, incentives are lower-the effect of changes in quality on market shares is not as large-and so is the investment response to an increase in a firm's own quality.
The effect of a cross-quality increase (right panel) is quite different. A firm's investment response to a quality upgrade by a competitor on the same platform is negative when inter-platform differences are large and mostly positive when they are small. We set aside the positive effects, which will be discussed in the next paragraph, and consider first the negative effects. When the reaction is negative, we see the following pattern: if a platform leads, then responses are the strongest when firms' qualities are close. This resembles the results from the R&D literature without platforms (e.g., Grossman and Shapiro, 1987) . In contrast, if the platform lags behind, the responses resemble the own-elasticity responses -the further ahead the firm, the stronger its negative response. The first pattern can be explained as follows: If a platform leads, it commands a large market share and competitors on this platform behave as if they were alone in the industry-competing for within-platform market share-and consequently reactions are the strongest when both firms on the leading platform are of similar strength. But if a platform lags behind, its market share is small; thus the more the lagging firm on this platform falls behind, the smaller are its future profit opportunities. The opposite is true for the leading firm. Recall that the attractiveness of a platform depends crucially on the survival probability of both firms on that platform. Consequently, a quality upgrade by the lagging firm strengthens its survival probability and thus the overall attractiveness of the lagging platform. Therefore, the reduction in withinplatform market share, which reduces incentives to invest, is partially offset by the network effect (increase in the platform's market share) and the leading firm reacts very little to a successful quality upgrade by its competitor.
In general, cross-investment elasticities are positive when platforms are close. The response is the stronger the smaller are intra-platform differences. This pattern can, again, be explained by the network effect. When platforms are of similar quality levels, a quality upgrade by firm -i improves the relative position of the entire platform. This, in turn, increases firm i's incentives to upgrade its software. This is also true in the other direction: a quality upgrade by firm i leads to increased investment from firm -i. Consequently, investments by the two firms on the same platform are gross complements. This relationship exists only in the neighborhood of equally strong platforms, and it is the strongest when firms are close competitors on the same platform. Once inter-platform differences increase, firms on the same platform find it more profitable to fight each other rather than to fight their rivals on the competing platform. We further explain this point in the next section.
It is instructive to analyze the link between competitive advantage and investment, for which we have to formally define competitive advantage in the context of our model. Recall that we followed Adner and Zemsky (2006) in defining a software firm's competitive advantage on its hardware platform as the additional willingness-to-pay consumers have for its software relative to the closest competitor on its own hardware platform. Now we are also in the position to define competitive advantage in the industry. From our model it follows that a platform's attractiveness is a function of the available software qualities on all platforms and the market share of each platform. A good proxy for this attractiveness is the sales-weighted average quality levels of a platform. Competitive advantage in the industry can then be measured as the additional willingness-to-pay consumers have for their software relative to the closest competitor on the same platform or the sales-weighted average willingness-to-pay of software firms on the competing platforms, whichever of the two is higher. 16 Figure 3 .3 shows the relationship between quality (which is, on average, equivalent to willingness-to-pay in our model) and competitive advantage. The left panel depicts competitive advantage of firm 1 relative to firm 2 on the same platform, while it depicts it relative to firm 3 on the other platform. Note that in figure 3 .2, an increase ∆-intra is equivalent to an increase in competitive advantage.
Comparing now figure 3.2 with figure 3.3, two features stand out. First, comparing the two left panels, changes in investment are inversely related to changes in competitive advantage: If a firm reduces its competitive disadvantage relative to a leading firm on the same platform, it increases its investment. Once it becomes the more competitive firm, it actually reduces its investment if it gains additional competitive advantage. Second, potential reductions in competitive advantage of a leading firm will only lead to higher investment of a firm when the competitive position of its platform is threatened. That is, only when platforms are close competitors. As figure 3.3 shows, however, this is the situation where the overall competitive advantage of a leading firm might be threatened. Interestingly, the effect is the most positive when both the competitive advantage within the platform and within the industry is at stake. In all other cases, firms actually reduce their investment. The reason behind this is the same in both cases: having competitive advantage is more important than the size of it. It only pays for firms to defend their competitive edge if another firm comes close enough to threaten its position. Otherwise, it sees no benefit of doing so.
In summary, the fact that consumers favor higher qualities provides an incentive for software firms to invest in upgrading their quality. Total investment is the highest the more similar are platforms' overall strengths. In this case, both the network effect and firms' fierce competition with each other on the same platform drive investment in the same direction. The network effect pushes firms on the same platform to "join" efforts and increase investment to improve the attractiveness of their platform. At the same time, the promise of a large market share gain on the same platform increases the value of stepping ahead of a competitor, thereby encouraging firms to fight each other. Finally, substantial differences across as well as within platforms lower overall investment.
A Taxonomy of Optimal Investment
The graphs above isolated the reaction to an upgrade of just one firm at a time: the firm itself or its competitor. We now investigate the interaction of these changes. The investment behavior induced by market structure suggests the following categorization: firm i's investment response to its own quality can either be aggressive, meaning that it will invest more if it successfully upgrades its quality, or complacent, implying it will decrease its level of investment. Similarly, firm i may respond aggressively or complacently to an increase in its competitor's quality level. The matrix below summarizes the optimal investment behavior for firms in markets with network effects. If the two firms' investment strategies are strategic complements, which is the case when both an ownand a cross-quality upgrade makes a firm aggressive, we call firm i a "Pack Hunter"-firms "work together"
to improve the relative position of their platform. We call a firm that competes alone against the rest of its industry a "Lone Wolf." This happens when its own quality upgrade makes it aggressive but its competitor's quality upgrade makes it complacent. A firm that lets its competitor on the same platform do the "hunting" is called a "Puppy Wolf." This results from a positive cross-quality elasticity and a complacent reaction to its own quality upgrade (i.e., "Mom" will bring the "prey"). Finally, we call a lone wolf that does not really attack, but just half-heartedly hunts and eats what it finds, a "Scavenger." The determinants of this category are both negative cross-and own-quality elasticities. Figure 3 .4 plots the market structures for which we see the different types of investment behavior of a particular firm. The graph shows the following: when platforms are of similar quality levels, a firm behaves as if it were "hunting" in a pack -it reacts aggressively to its own and its competitor's quality upgrade. 17 The firms behave as if they join forces and invest aggressively in order to strengthen the relative position of their platform. This holds as long as quality differences within and across platforms are not too large. A firm behaves as a "Lone Wolf" when it lags behind its competitor on a platform that is either far behind or sufficiently ahead. In this case, competition is mostly centered within platform rather than across platforms.
Successful investment then makes the firm more aggressive, since it can steal business from its competitor on the same platform. Another popular animal is the "Scavenger" -it reacts complacently to its own and its competitor's quality upgrade. "Scavengers" are firms with little incentives to improve the quality of the software. For example, a leading firm on a leading platform: the firm has no incentive to further increase its investment as it is not jeopardized by neither its competitor nor by the other platform; it can then just enjoys its life in ease. In case it is a leading firm on the lagging platform, it cannot win against the competing platform alone. Consequently, it just feeds on whatever market share its platform already has. Another 17 Unless explicitly stated otherwise, we always refer to the competitor on the same platform in this section.
interesting breed is the "Puppy Wolf." A firm reacts aggressively to a competitor's quality upgrade, but complacently to its own quality upgrade. This happens when platforms are competing closely but there is a large discrepancy between the quality levels of firms on the platform. In this case, the lagging firm has to catch up in order to turn a "Puppy Wolf" into a "Pack Hunter."
RECONCILING THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Our comparatively simple model was never designed to account for all of the various influences and conditions that may drive platform change. 18 Nevertheless, we can show how the forces we identify in our model played out in the competition between Apple and IBM in the micro-computing market. Since we are unable to observe investment directly, we use successful quality upgrades as ex-post measures of realized investment. With the help of our investment response matrix, these can then be interpreted as measures of competitive efforts. Keeping this in mind, we will concentrate on two mechanisms in reference to Apple and IBM compatible computers: (1) the intensity of competition in components and applications for the speed of innovation, and (2) the role of competitive responses. We have collected data on the quality of available components for Apple computers and IBM-compatible architectures. Our data show that, as the model predicts, platforms with higher levels of quality competition, and thus investment, manage to attract more consumers than platforms with lower levels of quality competition.
Our model predicts that the intensity of investment in quality upgrades and the resulting speed of innovation in applications and components are crucial for the success of a platform. We think of hardware and software in terms of relative life duration, and take hardware to be longer-lived and software to be the shorter-lived. Given this broad definition, since the components above are all shorterlived than the computers' architecture, components can be viewed as "software." Apple's and IBMcompatible PC's architectures can be then viewed as "hardware."
We managed to find reasonably useful data for CPUs, floppy discs and graphics adapters. 20 The following three graphs provide some insight into the competitive situation in the components market for While Apple users could only choose models from the Apple family, and for those models could only customize a limited set of components, users of IBM-compatible PCs could choose from a wide variety of vertically (and horizontally) differentiated models. 22 The graphs show that there was substantial quality competition and upgrading in components on both platforms. Nevertheless, IBM-compatible machines clearly 22 Arguably, customers perceived vertical differentiation through improved quality features (like higher CPU speed, resolution of the screen, higher disc capacity) as more important than horizontal differentiation through the choice of producers who made components with roughly similar quality features. The situation in the applications market (e.g., word-processors, spreadsheets, etc.) during the crucial period when Apple lost most of its market share is far less clear. While the first spreadsheet, VisiCalc, was first introduced on Apple, the acquisition of VisiCalc by Lotus and the subsequent development of Lotus 1-2-3 (operable only on IBM-compatible machines) changed the balance in the market in favor of IBM. Though
VisiCalc had many clones (both for the Apple and for IBM PC) none of these clones achieved high-enough quality to attract consumers. Lotus 1-2-3 was described by market analysts as a revolutionary product and was considered to be a "killer application" that sold IBM-compatible computers. 25 During this period, Apple's market share dropped from more than 15% in 1980 to about 3% by 1997 (Kwak and Yoffie, 1999) . These Another interesting illustration of the model's mechanics is Microsoft's more recent attempt to integrate software applications into its operating system. This move, at least partially, reverses the initial disintegration 23 This does not exclude that Apple machines had technical advantages at the time of introduction of particular models. Overall, however, the data points towards technological superiority of IBM-compatible machines. 24 Apple's founder and CEO, Steven Jobs, claims that the switch to the new Intel CPUs doubles the speed of Apple computers relative to its preceding generation. It should be noted, however, that Jobs compares apples with pears (pun intended): Apple's new machines use the latest in dual core technology from Intel, while the prior generation of Apple computers ran with a previous generation of CPUs, mainly from IBM. See, e.g., Flynn and Bajaj (2006) . 25 Apple also had its "killer application" -desktop publishing. However, the mass market found spreadsheets to be much more attractive than it did desktop publishing.
(open-architecture) strategy pursued by IBM in the PC market. Microsoft's integration strategy is consistent with our model's predictions: as long as a firm faces competition from alternative platforms, it should invite competition on its own platform (as IBM did), thus increasing overall investment on the platform and, with this, increasing the attractiveness of the platform. However, once a firm is on the dominant platform that has established itself as the industry standard, it should suppress competition in favor of monopoly rents.
This highlights the importance of investment in quality under various circumstances. IBM rapidly and forcefully orchestrated its competitive efforts to win market share from Apple. This can be easily translated into our investment response matrix above: in the early stages of the micro-computer industry, IBM, Microsoft and Intel joined forces and became "Pack Hunters" when they closed in on Apple. More generally, whenever competitors, on any of the hardware platforms IBM tried to control, including their mainframe computers, caught up with IBM, we saw IBM responding aggressively. In these cases, IBM's position moved from being a "Scavenger" that does not invest much to being a "Lone Wolf", or, as in the Micro-computer segment, a "Pack-Hunter". Arguably, while Microsoft still enjoys the "Scavenger" position for some of its products (like its operating system), Intel, for example, was pushed towards being a "Lone Wolf" in its segment of components by AMD.
Three lessons can be learned from this discussion. First, firms on the lagging platform (initially IBM, Intel, and Microsoft in our example) will more eagerly cooperate than firms on the dominant platform (Apple, at that stage) as long as initial quality differences across platforms are small. Firms on the lagging platform will also more eagerly invite competition in order to beat the dominant platform, while firms on the dominant platform will try to monopolize the market. Finally, if a competitor on the leading platform gets into the realm of a dominant firm, competitive responses will be aggressive (e.g., Intel).
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study how the existence of competing platforms influences optimal investment strategies. Since the existence of platforms and the resulting market structure lends itself to an analysis from a
competitive strategy perspective, we analyze two drivers of investment behavior: quality levels on the same platform and quality levels across platforms. We find that investment behavior is driven by network effects, that is, competition across platforms, as well as competition between firms on the same platform. The network effect "coordinates" investment behavior of software firms within platforms. Software firms' investment strategies on the same platform might be strategic complements, a phenomenon that we dub "pack-hunting," and the incentives to do so are stronger, the more equally strong the platforms are.
Competition between firms on the same platform increases investment of those firms if they are of similar strength, but reduces investment if they are not. If quality differences between firms are large, this negative effect on investment can outweigh the positive influence on investment through the network effect. This leads to a "lonely wolf" behavior for firms on the trailing or heavily contested platform or to a "scavenger"
behavior on the leading, uncontested platform. While the "lonely wolf" increases its investment as long as it is successful, the "scavenger" mainly lives on past investment. Finally, the "puppy wolf," being a leader on a leading platform, has low incentives to invest heavily. In short, the existence of platforms induces noteworthy departures from standard optimal investment behavior, which can be categorized once the main drivers have been identified.
Optimal investment may look different if software firms can produce for both platforms, only facing an adaptation cost. Hardware upgrades may introduce additional uncertainty, again changing optimal investment behavior. Differences in firm specific resources across platforms may further alter the picture. While we believe that we address the most salient issue of optimal investment in the presence of indirect network effects, we intend to investigate some of these additional issues in our future research.
APPENDIX A: QUALITY LEVELS OF SOFTWARE FIRMS ON PLATFORM A
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